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Abstract: Size-based scheduling is advocated to improve response times of small flows. While re-
searchers continue to explore different ways of giving preferential treatment to small flows without
causing starvation to other flows, little focus has been paid to the study of stability of systems that
deploy size-based scheduling mechanisms. The question on stability arises from the fact that, users
of such a system can exploit the scheduling mechanism to their advantage and split large flows into
multiple small flows. Consequently, a large flow in the disguise of small flows, may get the advantage
aimed for small flows. As the number of misbehaving users can grow to a large number, an operator
would like to learn about the system stability before deploying size-based scheduling mechanism, to
ensure that it won’t lead to an unstable system. In this paper, we analyse the criteria for the existence
of equilibria and reveal the constraints that must be satisfied for the stability of equilibrium points.
Our study exposes that, in a two-player game, where the operator strives for a stable system, and users
of large flows behave to improve delay, size-based scheduling doesn’t achieve the goal of improving
response time of small flows.
Key-words: Size-based scheduling, equilibrium
This text is also available as a research report of the Laboratoire de l’Informatique du Parallélisme
http://www.ens-lyon.fr/LIP.
Equilibrium in size-based scheduling systems
Résumé : L’ordonancement basé sur la taille est préconisé pour améliorer le temp de réponse des
petits flux. Alors que les chercheurs continuent d’explorer differentes manières de donner de la préfer-
ence au petits flux sans causer de famine aux autres flux, peu d’interet a été consacré à l’étude de la
stabilité des systémes utilisant ces mécanismes d’ordonancement. La question de la stabilité apparait
lorsque l’on concidère que les utilisateurs d’un tel système peuvent exploiter de tels mécanismes afin
d’en tirer un meilleur profit en divisant leurs grands flux en plusieurs petits. De ce fait, un grand flux
déguisé en petits flux profite des avantages accordés à ces derniers. Comme le nombre d’utilisateur
détournant le mécanisme peut devenir conséquent, un opérateur est en droit de se questionner sur
la stabilité du système avant de le déployer. Ce afin de garantir la stabilité. Dans ce papier, nous
analysons les critères d’existences des equilibres et montrons les contraintes qui doit être satisfaites
pour que ces équilibres soient stables. Notre étude montres que dans le jeux entre l’opérateur qui veut
deployer un système stable et l’utilisateur qui agit de maniére égoïste afin de minimiser son délai,
les mécanismes d’ordonancement basés sur la taille échouent dans leur but premier de minimiser les
délais des petits flux.
Mots-clés : Equilibre, ordonnancement basé sur la taille
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1 Introduction
Scheduling based on flow size (or flow age) has been gaining importance in the recent times. Re-
searchers have proposed different ways of scheduling based on size, ranging from SRPT (Shortest
Remaining Processing Time) to LAS (Least Attained Service) to MLPS (Multi-level Processor Shar-
ing) scheduling mechanisms [1, 2, 3]. These scheduling strategies differ from the general model for
flow scheduling in the Internet. The queues in the Internet nodes, though are served in an FCFS order
at packet level, can be modeled using an M/G/1-PS (processor sharing) queue at flow level. The mo-
tivation to deviate from this norm, and schedule flows based on size, is to give better completion time
to small flows. Strictly speaking, the aim has been to improve the conditional mean response time of
small flows, at negligible cost to large flows. LAS, for example, always gives highest priority to the
flow that has attained the least service. More details on size-based scheduling policies and the advan-
tages they bring, can be found in [4] and [2]. Note that, researchers use age-based scheduling to refer
to the scheduling schemes that are blind, in the sense that, they do not have information about the size
of the flow when it arrives, and hence uses its age (the number of bytes/packets already scheduled) to
make scheduling decision. Whereas, in this paper, we use the broader phrase size-based scheduling to
include all the policies that use age or size to make scheduling decisions.
A user (an end-user or an application) sends a file as a single flow across the Internet. We take
this as a normal behaviour. If size-based scheduling is deployed by an operator, there is a clear
motivation for one or more users to deviate from the normal behaviour. Indeed, there is an incentive
in splitting a flow (possibly large, but more precisely, one that is not small) into multiple small flows
to exploit the advantage (say, priority in scheduling) given to small flows to improve the response
time. If a considerable number of users deviate from the normal behaviour, then the operator’s aim
of giving shorter response time to small flows might well be deceived. More importantly, an operator
would like to know if such user manipulations would lead to an unstable system behaviour. This
poses an important problem in the context of size-based scheduling systems which, to the best of our
knowledge, has not been addressed yet. This is the problem we address in this work. In the scenario
where users do not misbehave, the stability issue (for network of queues) has been addressed in [5]
recently.
The focus of this work is to study the equilibria in size-based scheduling system where users
misbehave. We believe this would lead to better understanding of the implication of deploying a size-
based scheduling mechanism. More description of the problem is given in Section 2. The model is
elaborated in Section 3. The existence of equilibria are studied for two kinds of system behaviours:
one in which the service rates are fixed, is studied in Section 4; and the other in which the service
rates are varying, is studied in Sections 5 and 6. We summarize our analysis as a game between the
operator and users, in Section 7.
2 Problem statement and assumptions
We study the problem that arises when an operator deploys a size-based scheduling mechanism.
Though there are different ways of scheduling based on size, our focus is on size-based schedul-
ing using two queues. Here, flows are classified based on their sizes. Small flows are sent to one
queue, and large flows to another1. Each queue is assigned a specific service rate, such that the total
1A flow is called small if its size is less than a threshold, θ. In practice, θ bytes of every large flow also go to the small
queue. But, we ignore this to keep the model simple. Besides, this affects neither the analysis nor the results given here.
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service rate equals the line capacity. The aim of operator in setting such a mechanism is to give to
reduce the average response times of small flows.
To formulate the objective of the operator, we assume Poisson flow arrivals. Arrivals and service
rates are in units of small flow. λx and λy are the arrival rates for small and large flows respectively.
Each large is F times a small flow. The service rates at small and large queues are φx and φy respec-
tively, such that if C denotes the line capacity, φx + φy = C. Each queue is served using the PS
discipline; hence it is an M/G/1 − PS queue.
We study the existence of equilibria under the scenario where users cheat by splitting a large flow
into multiple small flows to improve their delay. This is explored in two cases: (i) where the service
rates assigned are static, (ii) where the operators exhibits control by dynamically changing the service
rates. In the latter case, we explore the existence of interesting equilibria, and state the conditions
required for stability, under the assumption that the incentive for players to migrate is to minimize the
delay the flow will incur. Note that, by ‘players’, we consider only the users who migrate.
3 Model description
x
y
λx
λyF
φx
φy
λyFm(x, y)
Figure 1: Two-queues model.
The fluid model used in this work is inspired by the one used in [6], where the authors analyse dy-
namic bandwidth resource allocation and migration between guaranteed performance and best effort
traffic classes.
The two-queues model is depicted in Fig. 1. The queue for small flows is called small queue and
is referred to as Qx. The other queue is called the large queue which is denoted by Qy. The number
of flows at Qx is represented by x. At the large queue, this number (in number of small flows) is
denoted by y. We assume infinite queues. The service rates, φx and φy, are also in number of small
flows. They are both assumed to take non-zero values.
The system parameters φx and φy are set by the operator. System state is modeled using averaged
queue sizes: x and y. Depending on the measured delay values, a user might decide to split a large
flow into multiple small flows. Therefore, a fraction of the flows arriving at the large queue might be
migrated to the small queue. This migration function, which is a result of aggregate user behaviour,
is represented as m(x, y). It is linear in λyF as a result of the integration of individual user that send
dλy each:
∫
mdλy = λym. We take m to be a non-negative and continuous function of x and y. m
represents the fraction of λy which goes to Qx.
0 ≤ m(x, y) ≤ 1 (1)
INRIA
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For every large flow that migrates, it adds an overhead of η (e.g. connection establishment cost,
slow-start cost). The rate equations can now be written as:
dx
dt
= λx − φx + λyFm(x, y)(1 + η), x > 0 (2)
dy
dt
= λyF − φy − λyFm(x, y), y > 0 (3)
The rate equations are different at the borders. For x = 0,
dx
dt
∣
∣
∣
∣
x=0
= [λx − φx + λyFm(x, y)(1 + η)]
+ (4)
and for y = 0,
dy
dt
∣
∣
∣
∣
y=0
= [λyF − φy − λyFm(x, y)]
+. (5)
4 System analysis for static service rates
This section details the analysis of a system where the service rates at both the queues are fixed.
Proposition 4.1. An interior point (x, y) is an equilibrium iff φx − λx = λyF − φy and m is such
that m(x, y) = φx−λx
λyF
and 0 ≤ m(x, y) ≤ 1.
Proof of Prop. 4.1. Let (x, y) be an interior point. It is an equilibrium if and only if :



dx
dt
= 0
dy
dt
= 0
0 ≤ m(x, y) ≤ 1
⇐⇒





m(x, y) = φx−λx
λyF (1+η)
m(x, y) =
λyF−φy
λyF
0 ≤ m(x, y) ≤ 1
Remark 4.2. Existence of interior equilibrium does not only depend on m function but also on the
arrival rates and service rates. Meaning that they can only exist in very specific cases.
Proposition 4.3. (0, 0) is an equilibrium point if and only if:





m(0, 0) ≤ φx−λx
λyF (1+η)
λyF−φy
λyF
≤ m(0, 0)
0 ≤ m(0, 0) ≤ 1
Proof of Prop. 4.3. Using equations (4) and (5), we obtain that (0, 0) is an equilibrium point if and
only if:





dx
dt
∣
∣
x=0
= 0
dy
dt
∣
∣
∣
y=0
= 0
0 ≤ m(0, 0) ≤ 1
⇐⇒



λx−φx
1+η + λyFm(0, 0) ≤ 0
λyF − φy − λyFm(0, 0) ≤ 0
0 ≤ m(0, 0) ≤ 1
⇐⇒





m(0, 0) ≤ φx−λx
λyF (1+η)
λyF−φy
λyF
≤ m(0, 0)
0 ≤ m(0, 0) ≤ 1
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Proposition 4.4. (0, y) with y > 0 is an equilibrium point if and only if:





m(0, y) ≤ φx−λx
λyF (1+η)
m(0, y) =
λyF−φy
λyF
0 ≤ m(0, y) ≤ 1
Proof of Prop. 4.4. Using equations (4) and (3), we obtain that (0, y) is an equilibrium point if and
only if:



dx
dt
∣
∣
x=0
= 0
dy
dt
= 0
0 ≤ m(0, y) ≤ 1
⇐⇒



λx−φx
1+η + λyFm(0, y) ≤ 0
λyF − φy − λyFm(0, y) = 0
0 ≤ m(0, y) ≤ 1
⇐⇒





m(0, y) ≤ φx−λx
λyF (1+η)
m(0, y) =
λyF−φy
λyF
0 ≤ m(0, y) ≤ 1
Proposition 4.5. (x, 0) with x > 0 is an equilibrium point if and only if:





m(x, 0) = φx−λx
λyF (1+η)
λyF−φy
λyF
≤ m(x, 0)
0 ≤ m(x, 0) ≤ 1
Proof of Prop. 4.5. Using equations (2) and (5), we obtain that (x, 0) is an equilibrium point if and
only if:





dx
dt
= 0
dy
dt
∣
∣
∣
y=0
= 0
0 ≤ m(0, y) ≤ 1
⇐⇒



λx−φx
1+η + λyFm(x, 0) = 0
λyF − φy − λyFm(x, 0) ≤ 0
0 ≤ m(x, 0) ≤ 1
⇐⇒





m(x, 0) = φx−λx
λyF (1+η)
λyF−φy
λyF
≤ m(x, 0)
0 ≤ m(x, 0) ≤ 1
4.1 Discussion
The aim of a network operator in deploying such a scheduling mechanism is to give shorter delays to
small flows, at negligible cost to large flows. With this in mind, we can now evaluate which among
the equilibrium points are interesting and useful (from the perspective of a network operator).
To start with, let us consider the equilibrium point (0, 0). The inequalities of Prop. 4.3 give the
shaded region of Fig. 2, where one m can exist to make (0, 0) an equilibrium. This region is dominated
by the line λx + λyF = C, which defines the region where a single queue system would have empty
queue equilibrium. Thus, this equilibrium (in the two queue system) is not of great interest for the
network operator.
INRIA
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0
λx
λyF
C
Cφx
φy
φx
1+η + φy
Figure 2: Existence region of equilibrium (0, 0) under static service rate.
The lines (x, 0) and (0, y) constitute the remaining border point equilibria. (x, 0) is the set of
those points where there is queueing in the small queue, but not at the large queue. For this reason,
these are not desirable equilibria from operator’s point of view. Similarly existence of (0, y) means,
there is nothing queueing at Qx. So, there is incentive for users to migrate to Qx. Hence (0, y) will
not be stable.
As seen in previous section, interior point equilibrium are only possible in limiting cases where
the surplus rate at the large queue is exactly equal to the surplus of service of x, with the additional
constraint that m transfers exactly this. This situation is too constrained to happen in a real scenario.
To introduce more flexibility, the operator can control the service rate. But this requires the use of
some observable parameters of the system. In this system, the only observable parameters are x and
y as arrival rates λx and λy are not separable at the queues.
5 Control on φx using parameter x
In this section we study the system when operator controls the service rates using a single parameter.
Let f be the control function, and x be the control parameter. In the remaining of this section we use
the following definition for φx(x) and φy(x).
Definition 5.1. φx(x) and φy(x)
φx(x) = f(x)
φy(x) = C − f(x)
C being the maximum link capacity (or service rate), let:
0 < f(x) < C (6)
so that the service rate at any queue doesn’t vanish.
RR n° 6888
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5.1 Delay condition
We introduce the delay condition which is satisfied at equilibrium, as the users have no incentive to
migrate once the delays at both queues are equal. Let us look the delay a large flow will incur Qx, if it
is split into F small flows. For a service rate of φx at Qx, each small flow gets
φx
x+F of service. Hence
the time to transfer a large flow through Qx is Tx = x+FFφx (1 + η). On the other hand, if the arriving
large flow decides to queue at Qy, the delay experienced will be Ty =
y+1
φy
.
At equilibrium, Tx = Ty; thus,
(x + F )(1 + η)
Fφx
=
y + 1
φy
(7)
5.2 Analysis of equilibrium
For equilibrium to exist, the equations (2) and (3) should be equated to zero.
Proposition 5.2. If η is zero, no equilibrium will exist unless C = λx + λyF .
Proof of Prop. 5.2. From the combination (2) + (3) at equilibrium, when η is 0, we get C = λx +
λyF .
In the remaining, η is taken to be strictly positive.
Using equations (2) and (3) at equilibrium, gives the constraints (8) on f for the existence of such
an equilibrium point.
f(xe) =
(1 + η)(C − λyF ) − λx
η
(8)
There can be multiple such points xe or no depending on f .
Proposition 5.3. For a given set of parameters (λx, λy, C, η, f, m) with η > 0, the system has inner
equilibrium points (xe, ye) where:
xe ∈ f
−1(
(1 + η)(C − λyF ) − λx
η
) (9)
and:
ye =
C − f(xe)
Ff(xe)
(xe + F )(1 + η) − 1
iff:









λx + λyF ≤ C
λx + λyF (1 + η) > C
f−1(
(1+η)(C−λyF )−λx
η
) 6= ∅
m(xe, ye) =
C−(λx+λyF )
ηλyF
(10)
Proof of Prop. 5.3. From the combination, (2) + (1 + η)(3), at equilibrium, we obtain Eq. (8). The
system has equilibriums iff there is point xe satisfying this equation, meaning f−1(
(1+η)(C−λyF )−λx
η
)
is not empty (η 6= 0). From Eq. (7), we get corresponding ye. Then from Eq. (2) at equilibrium, we
have m as defined in Eq. (10).
Due to constraint (1) on m, and constraint (6) on f , we have the existence of this equilibrium iff:
{
λx + λyF ≤ C
C < λx + λyF (1 + η)
(11)
Second inequality is strict because of Eq. (6).
INRIA
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Fig. 3 shows the region of arrival rates where equilibrium can exist, dashed-line is excluded from
this.
Corollary 5.4. If f is strictly monotonic. For every 2-tuple of (λx, λy) satisfying the line equation:
(1 + η)(C − λyF ) − λx = k (for a constant k), there is maximum of one equilibrium point.
Proof. Corollary 5.4
If f is strictly monotonic, there is utmost one pre-image by f−1. As potential equilibria are
determined by Eq. (9) (and ye which only depends on xe), all points of the line of arrival rates:
(1 + η)(C − λyF ) − λx = k have the same potential equilibrium. Since m(xe, ye) has to satisfy
Eq. (10), which gives a different line in λx and λy, there is at most one equilibrium point (the
intersection).
λx
λyF
C
C
C
(1+η)
Figure 3: Interior equilibrium existence region under φx(x) = f(x).
From the above, it can be observed that, for a monotonic f , there exists utmost one equilibrium
point for the whole line of arrival rates. This gives only a few equilibrium points for a wide range
of arrival rates. A non-monotonic f will give more equilibrium points. But still, it is not feasible
to obtain equilibrium points for all values of (λx, λy) satisfying the line of arrival rates, as it would
require an infinite queue or an infinite variability of f .
Hence, we conclude that control using a function of x alone, is not of any use to the operator.
6 Control on φx using parameters x and y
As seen in previous section, using only one parameter is not enough to stabilize the system as the
control space is too small. We thus use a control function with two parameters: x and y.
RR n° 6888
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Definition 6.1. φx(x, y) and φy(x, y)
φx(x, y) = g(x, y)
φy(x, y) = C − g(x, y)
Similar to what have been done with f , if C is the maximum link capacity (or service rate), let:
0 < g(x, y) < C (12)
Note that, definition of delay equation at equilibrium as given in (7) remains the same and so we
directly proceed to the analysis of potential equilibria.
6.1 Analysis of equilibrium
For equilibrium to exist, the equations (2) and (3) should be equated to zero. Prop. 5.2 still holds in
this case as φx and φy also sum to C; therefore from equations (2) and (3) we can prove the same.
Hence η is also taken strictly positive here.
Similarly to what have been done for Prop.5.3, at equilibrium, using Eq. (2) and (3), we obtain
the following constraint on g:
g(xe, ye) =
(1 + η)(C − λyF ) − λx
η
(13)
Proposition 6.2. For a given set of parameters (λx, λy, C, η, g,m) with η > 0, the system has inner
equilibrium points (xe, ye) iff:















g(xe, ye) =
(1+η)(C−λyF )−λx
η
m(xe, ye) =
C−(λx+λyF )
ηλyF
(x+F )(1+η)
Fφx
= y+1
φy
λx + λyF ≤ C
λx + λyF (1 + η) > C
(14)
Proof of Prop. 6.2. Same as Prop. 5.3 except that (8) has been replaced by (13).
Note that the region of arrival rates where equilibrium points can exist is the same.
We define an equivalent load Γ:
Definition 6.3. Γ(λx, λy) =
λx
1+η + λyF .
Definition 6.4. D(Γ) is the set of (x, y) satisfying:
y = a(Γ)x + b(Γ) (15)
where
a(Γ) =
(1 + η)Γ − C
F (C − Γ)
and
b(Γ) =
(2 + η)Γ − 2C
C − Γ
INRIA
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Proposition 6.5. For a given setting of arrival rates (λx, λy) satisfying
Γ(λx, λy) = k (16)
and the two inequalities of Prop. 6.2, equilibria (xe, ye) under this load are on D(k). Besides, for all
the equilibrium points in D(k), g satisfies (13) and is constant:
g(xe, ye) =
1 + η
η
(C − Γ) (17)
Proof of Prop. 6.5. Let (λx, λy) be a setting of arrival rates satisfying Eq. (16) and the two inequali-
ties of Prop. 6.2.
We first show that D(k) contains all the potential equilibrium points. By replacing g using Eq.
(13) in the delay equation (7), we obtain Eq. (15).
All equilibrium points of arrival settings satisfying (16) have the same value of g as Eq. (13) holds
and gives Eq. (17) which is constant in Γ(λx, λy).
Fig. 4 shows Γ-lines in the λxλy-plane and their corresponding D(Γ)-lines in the xy-plane. On
each such line in the xy-plane, g is constant and thus gradient is orthogonal. From Eq. (17), we also
know ∂g
∂Γ is negative which justifies the orientation of gradient on the figure.
λx
λyFy
x
D(Γ2)
D(Γ3)
C
C
(1+η)
C
D(Γ1) Γ3
Γ2
Γ1
∇g
Figure 4: Interior equilibrium existence region and mapping of Γ(λx, λy) lines to D(Γ), level sets and
gradient field of g(x, y).
Proposition 6.6. For any (λx, λy) verifying the two inequalities of Prop. 6.2, D(Γ(λx, λy)) for does
not intersect in first quadrant.
Proof of Prop. 6.6. For Γ(λx, λy) = Γ satisfying the two inequalities of Prop. 6.2, satisfy: (1+η)Γ >
C and C ≥ λx + λyF > Γ.
Under this, da
dΓ and
db
dΓ are strictly positive and a is strictly positive. Thus, D(Γ(λx, λy)) do not
intersect in the first quadrant.
This basically means g is ‘feasible’. As a corollary of Prop. 6.6, we give:
Corollary 6.7. g can exist in the sense that there are no incompatible constraints resulting from Prop.
6.2.
Proof of Corollary 6.7. Prop. 6.5 gives the value g must have on D(Γ) in order to have equilibria on
it and according to Prop. 6.6 these lines do not intersect in the first quadrant where g can be defined.
It proves there is no incompatibility in the definition of g.
RR n° 6888
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Proposition 6.8.
lim
Γ→C−
a(Γ) = +∞ ; lim
Γ→ C
1+η
+
a(Γ) = 0
lim
Γ→C−
b(Γ) = +∞ ; lim
Γ→ C
1+η
+
b(Γ) = −1
Proof of Prop. 6.8. Trivial.
In particular, this last proposition implies that g can be defined in the whole first quadrant using
Eq. (13) and lines D(Γ).
As of now, we demonstrated that it is feasible to define g so that point of D(Γ) can be equilibria
for (λx, λy) on Γ line. Next, we study the stability of the potential equilibria in order to define the
additional constraints on m. The only constraint on m coming from existence of equilibrium (Prop.
6.2) is that m(xe, ye) =
C−(λx+λyF )
ηλyF
. The point where this will hold is not specified and depends on
m. Defining m will thus define a mapping of arrival rates (λx, λy) to the actual equilibrium point.
6.2 Stability of the equilibria and definition of m
As demonstrated in the previous section, g that doesn’t prevent existence of equilibrium is feasible.
We now like to have the constraints that m has to satisfy. We already know from the previous section
the range m must cover, but we don’t know where they have to be located in xy-plane. In order to get
more constraints on m, we study the conditions for stable equilibriums. To do so we rely on Hartman
Grobman theorem and the study of the stability of the linearized system.
Proposition 6.9. For an equilibrium point (xe, ye) as defined by Prop. 6.2 if the following equations
hold:





∂m
∂x
< (1+ye)C
λy(F (2+η+ye)+xe(1+η))2
∂m
∂x
+
(
ye + 1
xe + F
)
∂m
∂y
< 0
(18)
then (xe, ye) is asymptotically stable.
Proof of Prop. 6.9. To analyse of the equilibrium point (xe, ye), we take the Jacobian J of the rate
equations (2) and (3) at this point. The partial derivatives ∂g
∂x
and ∂g
∂y
at (xe, ye) are obtained from the
delay equation, Eq. (7).
∂g
∂x
(xe, ye) =
(1 + η)(ye + 1)FC
(Fye + xe(1 + η) + F (2 + η))2
(19)
∂g
∂y
(xe, ye) = −
(1 + η)(xe + F )FC
(Fye + xe(1 + η) + F (2 + η))2
(20)
The equilibrium point (xe, ye) is asymptotically stable if the eigenvalues of the J at (xe, ye) have
strictly negative real parts [7, Ch. 2 & 5]. Characteristic polynomial of J is:
λ2 +
(λyF (
∂m
∂y
− (1 + η)∂m
∂x
) + ∂g
∂x
− ∂g
∂y
) λ +
η(λyF (
∂m
∂x
∂g
∂y
− ∂m
∂y
∂g
∂x
))
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From this and equations (19) and (20), real parts of the roots are strictly negative iff:
(1 + η)
∂m
∂x
−
∂m
∂y
<
(1 + η)C(1 + xe + ye + F )
λy(F (2 + ye + η) + xe(1 + η))2
(21)
and
∂m
∂x
+
(
ye + 1
xe + F
)
∂m
∂y
< 0 (22)
Inequalities of the proposition are obtained using combination of equations (21) and (22).
Proposition 6.2 and 6.9 give sufficient conditions on m to define stable equilibria. Next, we prove
that there exists m which stabilizes the system for any arrival setting.
Proposition 6.10. There exists an m satisfying the constraints of propositions 6.2 and 6.9 which
stabilizes the system for any arrival rates in the shaded region of the Fig. 4.
Proof of Prop. 6.10. We prove this by exhibiting one such m. Let m be such that
m(x, y) = e−xy
The m satisfies the constraints of Eq. (18) for any λy in (0, C) as ∂m∂x = −ye
−xy and ∂m
∂y
=
−xe−xy, are both strictly negative on the interior. Besides, as m ranges from 1 to 0, from the borders
(y = 0 and x = 0) to infinity, thus by continuity, there exists an equilibrium point (xe, ye) where
m(xe, ye) =
C−(λx+λyF )
ηλyF
for any arrival rates as all D(Γ)-lines enter the first quadrant by one its
borders.
Note that if m is strictly monotonic, there is only one equilibrium point for any arrival rate setting
in the equilibrium existence region (refer Fig. 3) located at the intersection of the level set of g and
m. In addition, it is not possible to apply this for all setting of arrival rates in order to get equilibria
for all of them, unless queue are infinite.
Proposition 6.11. If queues are finite, some setting of arrival rates can’t have equilibrium.
Proof of Prop. 6.11. As a(Γ) tends to 0 when Γ tends to C/1 + η+, and b(Γ) tends to -1, intersection
of y = 0 and D(Γ) tends to infinity. Hence, for any xmax, it is possible to find Γ close enough to
C/1+η so that equilibrium which have to be on D(Γ) (due to Prop. 6.5) would have to be after xmax.
Using limits of a(Γ) and b(Γ) when Γ tends to C, it is possible to pursue the same reasoning and
prove that for some settings of arrival rates, there can’t be equilibrium under finite queue for large
flows.
Thus we see that, the system can attain stability depending on the decision of users, and the control
function used by operator.
7 Game
We summarize our results in the form of a game with two players: operator and user (with a large
flow to send). Here, we make the fair assumption that Tx < Ty. The operator can take one of the two
actions:
• AFP: Assume fair play, and not use a g.
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• AUP: Assume unfair play, and use a g.
From the users, we consider a collective behaviour.
• UC: Users cheat,
• UR: Users rightful
Under AUP, Tx = Ty. We use preferential ordering of payoffs for both players. That is (ao, au) ≺p
(a′o, a
′
u), if player p prefers second strategy over the first. The letter o is used to refer to operator, and
u to refer to users.
• (AFP, UR) ≺u (AFP, UC): Users prefer to cheat when the operator does nothing to stop them
from cheating, as this would give them shorter response time in the small queue (when Tx <
Ty).
• (AUP, UR) ≺u (AUP, UC): Users also prefer to cheat when the operators are aware and are
setting service rates dynamically to achieve stability, as this would ensure a finite queue; hence
a finite delay. Observe that, if the don’t cheat (and stay in Qy), there is no equilibrium (from
Prop. 6.2); hence the queue will build up without bound.
Therefore, it can be drawn that UC strictly dominates UR under any action of the operator (AFP
or AUP). Hence, the action UR can be eliminated [8]. So, what lefts to be analysed is the preference
of operator under this user action (UR). We see, (AFP, UC) ≺o (AUP, UC), as there is no equilib-
rium for general arrival rates (from Prop. 6.2, and if Tx remains less than Ty, migration will create
additional load due to η) leading to overflow.
From the above analysis, (AUP, UC) is a Nash equilibrium in the two-players game. That is,
assuming operators and users are rational, users will tend to cheat, and operators will look to stabilize
the system to maintain finite queues (when the system is operating near to saturation, depending on
η).
Note that if the operator’s setting of service rates is such that Tx > Ty, then migrating to small
queue is no more an incentive for large flows. This doesn’t preclude operator from favoring small
flows as x
φx
< y
φy
can still hold. In such a scenario, it can be seen that (AFP, UR) will be a Nash
equilibrium. This situation can happen if η is large enough and φy
φx
can be maintained such that:
{
φy
φx
< y
x
y+1
x+f
F
1+η <
φy
φx
Second constraint will not be satisfied if operator want to favor small flows too much, say, as in the
priority based scheduling proposed in [2]; meaning that it will be of interest for users to cheat.
8 Conclusions
Starting from the setting of static service rates, and moving to dynamic service rate settings, we
analysed the existence of equilibria. For the existence of equilibria that is of interest to the operator,
it is necessary to have control over the service rate as a function of the queue lengths. Even then, not
all the stable equilibrium points are of interest to the operator, as they give the same delay to small
and large flows. Therefore, if a large number of users cheat, the operator has no visible incentive in
deploying a size-based scheduling system.
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The focus of our study revolved around saturation (of the line capacity) as we assumed that there
is some cost η incurred due to migration. In the future, we plan to analyse the system in overload.
Similarly, it would be interesting to understand what happens if the operator deploys a mechanism to
detect and shift some of the disguised large flows from the small queue to the large queue.
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